A continuously published, independently reproducible security run against the live LEMNI contract and its live Uniswap V3 pool. Every run executes the same class of behavioral test commercial token scanners use — buy on the DEX with a fresh wallet, transfer between unenrolled wallets, sell back — on a fork of Polygon mainnet, and records every transaction, revert reason and execution trace. Machine-readable results: latest.json · runs.json · API documentation.
LEMNI passes the standard behavioral honeypot methodology: a fresh, never-enrolled wallet bought on the live DEX and sold its position back through the live router in the same forked-mainnet environment commercial token scanners use. A "honeypot" or "cannot sell" designation is contradicted by this reproducible test.
Round-trip cost (buy then full sell) was 1.989% — attributable to the pool fee tier and price impact of the trade size, i.e. ordinary AMM mechanics, not a tax or extraction mechanism in the token.
Plain ERC-20 transfers between two never-enrolled wallets succeed. The dual-authority post-quantum protection binds only wallets that opt in by registering keys; it imposes nothing on ordinary holders, so a behavioral simulator has no transfer restriction to observe.
Executed on a local fork of Polygon mainnet at the block shown above, against the live, deployed contract and pool. Wallets are generated fresh for the run and have never enrolled post-quantum keys. Full callTracer traces for any reverting step are preserved under this run's evidence directory.
| Step | What it does | Result | Revert / error |
|---|---|---|---|
| resolve_pool | Locate the live Uniswap V3 LEMNI/USDC pool on the forked chain | OK | — |
| fund_usdc | Credit wallet A with 500 USDC by direct storage write on the fork — the standard test-harness "deal"; no real funds involved | OK | — |
| approve_usdc | Wallet A approves the Uniswap router to spend its USDC 0x71b0d10beff5c7235cdab802742a25cb82990c924ce9745009e302f97b5cd2a5 |
OK | — |
| buy | Honeypot methodology step 1: the fresh, never-enrolled wallet buys LEMNI through the live Uniswap V3 router 0x36a655b085246334c4c8b9c176c863ce8bb09f22bc60151031d061e11efbf414 |
OK | — |
| transfer_a_to_b | Plain ERC-20 transfer between two fresh, never-enrolled EOAs (A → B) — directly tests whether unenrolled wallets move LEMNI freely 0xe4bc56c00d81cf3718296943ce7c7697ba5270976b3f99ac953198667c0f479d |
OK | — |
| transfer_b_to_a | Return transfer (B → A) 0x6449e8165b2e1ed87d06d1aa23b06718a2fc31d81afff83db365ace6c9abcbd3 |
OK | — |
| approve_lemni | Wallet A approves the Uniswap router to spend its LEMNI 0xa496c1cb8d92e4ed27e7878f4d20c5f1cf7ffffa551eb0c1f6a579d581702b6f |
OK | — |
| sell_100pct | Honeypot methodology step 2: sell 100% of holdings back through the live router 0x6b374e95138ec264598b8522ce8d4e87878723af5574e2bfa288a2f02e9a920f |
OK | — |
An EIP-2535 Diamond with a conditional (signature-gated) transfer path matches, on code shape alone, the same patterns static classifiers use to flag scam tokens: 'upgradeable', 'non-standard transfer', 'per-wallet gate'. Here those shapes implement the patented dual-authority post-quantum protection documented at https://lemnicoin.com/Blockaid_Technical_Explanation.pdf. Whether the token actually restricts holders is a behavioral question — answered by the simulation in this same run.
| Function present | Selector | Category | What a naive static scanner reads it as |
|---|---|---|---|
| paused() | 0x5c975abb | pause-state | read-only getter reporting whether the contract is paused — not itself a pause capability |
| facets() | 0x7a0ed627 | upgradeability | EIP-2535 Diamond proxy (upgradeable) |
| owner() | 0x8da5cb5b | ownership | privileged owner exists |
Public scanner APIs queried at run time; raw responses preserved verbatim in the evidence directory.
| Scanner | Type | Verdict | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| GoPlus Security | static+simulation | clean | {"cannot_sell_all":"0","cannot_buy":"0","is_proxy":"1","is_open_source":"1","honeypot_with_same_creator":"0","buy_tax":"0","sell_tax":"0","holder_count":"134"} |
| honeypot.is | simulation | unsupported_or_error | — |
| Dexscreener | market-data | no_pairs_indexed | — |
Each run: anvil --fork-url <polygon-rpc> at the then-current block → fund a fresh wallet by test-harness storage write → buy LEMNI via Uniswap SwapRouter02 → plain ERC-20 transfers between two fresh wallets → sell back via the router → record receipts, revert data and debug_traceTransaction callTracer output. Anyone with a Polygon RPC endpoint can replay it; the JSON artifacts carry everything needed. Context on the mechanism automated scanners misread: LEMNI technical explanation (PDF).